Finding SIGTARP in the Separation of
Powers Labyrinth by Siegel, Jonathan R.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 1 Article 11
Winter 1-1-2011
Finding SIGTARP in the Separation of Powers
Labyrinth
Jonathan R. Siegel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan R. Siegel, Finding SIGTARP in the Separation of Powers Labyrinth, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
447 (2011), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol68/iss1/11
Finding SIGTARP in the Separation of 
Powers Labyrinth 
Jonathan R. Siegel* 
I. Introduction 
Aaron Sims has written a fine paper on a worthy subject.1  He 
carefully examines the details of the statute creating the Special Inspector 
General for the TARP program (the SIGTARP) and puts them in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. He 
usefully calls attention to several notable features of the SIGTARP statute.2 
He deserves praise for his good work. 
His ultimate conclusion, however, seems mistaken. He gives too little 
weight to the President’s power to remove the SIGTARP at will, and too 
much weight to the Secretary of the Treasury’s obligation to respond to 
deficiencies in the TARP program identified by the SIGTARP. When the 
SIGTARP scheme is compared to statutory schemes that have been 
approved by the Supreme Court, it seems likely that it is constitutional. 
This short response first praises the strong aspects of Mr. Sims’s 
paper.3  It then lays out a general structure for examining separation of 
powers questions, which suggests that the cases must be placed into distinct 
categories according to several key factors.4  Finally, it applies the 
suggested structure to the SIGTARP statute and concludes that the statute is 
likely constitutional.5 
* Professor of Law and Kahan Research Professor, George Washington University 
Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard College. The author is on leave from 
GW while serving as the Director of Research and Policy for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States. This Article is written in the author’s academic capacity. It reflects the 
author’s views and is not endorsed by the United States or any agency thereof. 
1. Aaron R. Sims, SIGTARP and the Executive-Legislative Clash: Confronting a 
Bowsher Issue with an Eye Toward Preserving the Separation of Powers During Future 
Crisis Legislation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011). 
2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5231 (2006). 
3. Infra Part II. 
4. Infra Part III. 
5. Infra Part IV. 
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II. Where Praise Is Due 
Before turning to critique, it is appropriate to begin with well-merited 
praise, starting with praise for those who conceived the excellent idea of 
having a colloquium to highlight student scholarship. The legal academy is 
currently debating the purposes of law school and the activities that should 
make up a student’s legal education.6  But no one can doubt that at least one 
purpose of law schools is the production of legal scholarship, including 
legal scholarship by students. A forum to celebrate student scholarship is 
therefore most fitting. 
Mr. Sims has contributed to this forum, first of all, by choosing an 
excellent topic. The constitutional status of Inspectors General has not 
received the thorough examination that it deserves, and, as Mr. Sims shows, 
the Special Inspector General for the TARP program has some distinctive 
characteristics that make him suitable for special attention. Mr. Sims’s 
topic is also very timely. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board7  signals that the 
Court may now be taking a somewhat harder line on congressional 
intrusions into executive branch prerogatives, so it is especially useful to 
examine potential violations of separation of powers that take the form of 
restraints on the President. 
Mr. Sims pays careful attention to the details of the SIGTARP statute. 
He has thoroughly catalogued the various ways in which this Special 
Inspector General differs from a more ordinary Inspector General. He 
points out the ways in which these details might give rise to separation of 
powers concerns. His paper is also well written. It lays out its arguments 
very clearly, avoids getting sidetracked, and makes good use of authority. 
Overall, the paper is a worthy contribution to student scholarship. 
III. Identifying the Right Test in Separation of Powers Law 
To appreciate the difficulties with Mr. Sims’s conclusions about 
SIGTARP, it is necessary first to lay out some background in separation of 
6. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, 
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW (2007) (commonly known as the Carnegie Report). 
7. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 
(2010) (holding that certain "dual for-cause limitations" on the President’s ability to remove 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violated the separation of 
powers). 
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powers law. In separation of powers cases, the first step is to identify the 
applicable test. There is no universal test for separation of powers cases.8 
The landscape is littered with a multitude of tests, each of which has its 
own area of application. Sometimes the applicable test is whether Congress 
has "impede[d] the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty,"9 
but other times it is whether Congress has laid down an "intelligible 
principle" for the executive to follow.10  In still other cases, the courts apply 
a multi-factor balancing test.11  Given all the different tests that swirl 
around, it is easy to get lost in the separation of powers labyrinth. To find 
one’s way, it is necessary to identify which test applies to a particular case. 
Identification of the correct test is aided by categorizing a case based 
on several factors. First, one should consider the factors articulated in 
Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure case.12  As 
Justice Jackson observed, cases in which Congress has authorized executive 
action have a different flavor from those in which Congress has forbidden 
executive action, and cases in which Congress has done neither of these are 
different from either. 
A second factor to consider is the branch of government involved. 
Justice Jackson’s opinion considered only whether Congress has authorized 
or prohibited action by the executive branch, but his analysis can be 
extended to the other branches. Separation of powers cases can also 
concern matters in which Congress has authorized or prohibited action by 
itself (the legislative branch) or by the judiciary. 
Finally, a remaining factor is that there may be another branch of 
government that is secondarily involved. If a case concerns a legislative 
attempt to grant extra power to one branch of government, that power may 
come at the expense of some other branch. So one may further categorize 
8. Mr. Sims suggests that there is a "consolidated rule," see Sims, supra note 1, at 
397 (stating that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison v. Olson, Mistretta v. United 
States, and Bowsher v. Synar combine to form a "consolidated rule" with respect to 
separation of powers clashes between Congress and the President), but the cases suggest 
different rules with different spheres of application. 
9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
10. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
11. E.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) 
(noting that, in Article III separation of powers cases, the Court has "declined to adopt 
formalistic and unbending rules[,]" but has, instead, elected to "weigh a number of factors"). 
12. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth a "grouping of practical situations in which a 
President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the 
legal consequences of this factor of relativity"). 
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the cases by asking not only which branch of government is gaining power, 
but which branch is losing power. 
These three factors cannot capture all the subtleties of the separation of 
powers cases, but they produce useful legal categories. If one asks whether 
a given case involves congressional authorization, congressional 
prohibition, or neither; which branch is at the receiving end of 
congressional attention; and which branch is secondarily affected, the 
answers to these questions produce categories of cases, and each category 
typically has its own legal test. 
Consider, for example, cases in which Congress has granted power to 
the Executive, and the question is whether the executive may 
constitutionally receive this power. These cases are the nondelegation 
cases, such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,13  and they 
teach that the applicable test is whether Congress has laid down an 
intelligible principle for the executive to follow.14  On the other hand, 
where Congress tries to limit the power of the executive, the case is more 
like Morrison v. Olson, and the test is whether Congress is impeding the 
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.15 
If the congressional authorization or prohibition runs not to the 
executive branch, but to the legislative branch, the relevant cases and tests 
are different. If Congress tries to authorize itself to exercise powers not 
granted by the Constitution, the relevant cases are Bowsher v. Synar and 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which articulate the 
nonaggrandizement principle that prohibits such action.16  In the (rare) case 
in which Congress tries to prohibit itself from taking action, it runs into the 
principle that "one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its 
successors."17 
13. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–30 (1935) 
(finding that "Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested" without first establishing the standard to 
guide the exercise of the transferred legislative power). 
14. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409. 
15. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
16. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734–36 (1986) (concluding that the assignment 
by Congress to the Comptroller General of certain executive functions violated the 
separation of powers because Congress reserved the removal power over the Comptroller 
General); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–59 (1983) 
(finding that a statute’s one-House legislative veto contravened the separation of powers 
because it gave to Congress power not granted by the Constitution). 
17. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996). 
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A case such as Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor18 
may at first seem to challenge the categories so far established. That case 
concerned a scheme by which Congress gave additional authority to the 
executive (namely, the authority to resolve certain disputes between private 
parties), so according to the categories so far one might think the statute 
would be subject to the generous Schechter Poultry test. In fact, the Court 
applied a more stringent test (although still upholding the statutory 
scheme). The reason implicates the third factor listed above, which has not 
yet come into play. Although Schor and Schechter Poultry are alike in that 
they both involve the executive branch’s obtaining extra power, they differ 
with regard to the branch from which that power is taken. In Schechter 
Poultry, the executive gained power at the expense of the legislative 
branch; in Schor, the executive gained power at the expense of the judicial 
branch. The cases therefore show that the third factor must be considered 
also. Where Congress attempts to give legislative-like power to the 
executive, Schechter Poultry provides the governing test; where Congress 
gives power to the executive at the expense of the courts, CFTC v. Schor 
applies. 
Thus, the separation of powers cases break down into different 
categories, each of which has its own test. Putting a case into the right 
category does not resolve the case—having identified the right test, one 
must still apply the test—but the categories help by identifying the right 
test. They also help by identifying the set of cases that provide the 
appropriate points of comparison in applying the test. Many of the tests 
applied in separation of powers cases are rather mushy.19  In practice, 
application of such a test usually turns on comparing the case at hand to 
cases already decided.20  Other cases in the same doctrinal category provide 
the best guide to how the next case should come out. 
18. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) 
(concluding that the "limited jurisdiction that the CFTC asserts over state law claims as a 
necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims willingly submitted by the parties for 
initial agency adjudication does not contravene separation of powers principles or Article 
III"). 
19. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (stating that the test is whether Congress has 
impeded the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty); Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 
(setting forth an explicit multi-factor balancing test for analyzing Article III separation of 
powers issues). 
20. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751–52 (1984) (observing that, in applying the 
mushy concepts of standing doctrine, the question presented by a case "can be answered 
chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior 
standing cases"). 
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IV. SIGTARP and Separation of Power 
The background established above helps to explain the difficulties 
with Mr. Sims’s conclusions about SIGTARP. The most fundamental 
question is whether Mr. Sims is applying the correct test. Mr. Sims treats 
the SIGTARP statute as implicating the nonaggrandizement test of Chadha 
and Bowsher.21  But as discussed above, that test applies when Congress 
attempts to give additional power to itself. Cases in which Congress 
restrains the power of the executive are in a different category. As Mr. 
Sims himself recognizes, a congressional restraint on the power of the 
President does not implicate the nonaggrandizement principle unless the 
power that is taken from the President is given to Congress.22 
Mr. Sims suggests that, notwithstanding the lack of any formal 
addition of power to Congress in the SIGTARP statute, the statute should 
be treated as implicating the nonaggrandizement principle because of 
various subtle ways in which the SIGTARP is made loyal to Congress.23  
This argument, however, gives too little weight to the fact that the President 
retains full power to remove the SIGTARP. Mr. Sims says that the 
SIGTARP is a creature of Congress because Congress retains all other 
powers over the SIGTARP, besides the removal power.24  This 
arrangement, however, is not so different from the rules applicable to most 
top-level executive branch officials. If one looks through most of the 
members of the President’s cabinet (putting the military aside), one finds 
that Congress has almost all the power over them, except the removal 
power. Congress gives them their duties. Congress fixes their salary. 
Congress sets their budget. Congress demands reports from them. As to 
most of them, there is no statute that generally instructs them, "Do what the 
President tells you to do."25 
21. See Sims, supra note 1, at 428 (applying the Bowsher rule and concluding that the 
SIGTARP dynamic violates this rule). 
22. See id. at 415 (stating that the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence in 
Bowsher and Morrison suggests that the Court will "tolerate congressional restriction of 
executive discretion as long as the stripped discretion is not subsumed by Congress"). 
23. See id. at 417–23 (describing the SIGTARP’s independence from the executive 
branch and its loyalty to Congress). 
24. Id. at 425–26. 
25. See generally Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to Administer the 
Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006) (cataloguing the various ways in which Congress 
delegates powers to agencies, sometimes with, and sometimes without, requiring that the 
agency follow the directives of the President). 
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So why do cabinet officials do what the President tells them to do? 
Because the President has the removal power. The removal power is the 
key lever through which the President exercises control over the federal 
government. The critical importance of the removal power explains why 
there are epochal battles over whether the President has the power over 
particular officials.26  So that power cannot be so easily dismissed—it is 
critical to separation of powers cases. 
But, Mr. Sims suggests, the SIGTARP is in a special position because, 
even though he serves at the pleasure of the President, the nature of his job 
27 is such that he is supposed to exercise independent judgment. He is not 
supposed to do whatever the President asks, just because the President 
could remove him. The President could get into political hot water if he 
actually removed the SIGTARP. 
Again, however, this posture is not really unique. The United States 
Attorneys, for example, serve at the pleasure of the President, but they are 
not supposed to do just anything the President wants. They follow his 
general programmatic direction, but they also make individual prosecutorial 
decisions based on the facts of each case, exercising some independent 
judgment. And a President did get into hot water for firing some of them.28 
But these officials are not thereby transformed into creatures of Congress. 
They are still in the executive, even though they exercise some independent 
judgment. 
So the questions Mr. Sims raises about SIGTARP do not fall within 
the Chadha-Bowsher category. The rule of Morrison applies. And, 
comparing the rules governing SIGTARP to the kinds of constraints on 
presidential power that the Supreme Court has approved under the 
Morrison line of cases reveals that the SIGTARP rules are less intrusive on 
presidential authority than other things that have already been approved. 
26. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–97 (1988) (determining that a 
"good cause" restriction on the executive’s power to remove an independent counsel did not 
violate the separation of powers); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 
(1935) ("The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to 
require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot 
well be doubted; and that authority includes . . . power to . . . forbid their removal except for 
cause in the meantime."). 
27. See Sims, supra note 1, at 413–20 (describing the SIGTARP’s independence from 
the executive branch). 
28. See, e.g., David Johnston, House Democrats Push Gonzales on Attorney 
Dismissals but Gain No Details on Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at 24 ("House 
Democrats pressed Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at a hearing on Thursday to 
provide specifics about why federal prosecutors had been dismissed, but he stuck to his past 
assertions that, although ineptly handled, the dismissals were justified and appropriate."). 
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Let’s look at the things that Mr. Sims singles out as potentially 
problematic. First of all, Mr. Sims claims, the SIGTARP does not report to 
the Treasury Secretary.29  We may assume this to be true, although, as Mr. 
Sims duly notes, the matter is not crystal clear.30 
Still, the point is hardly unique. After all, the Treasury Secretary does 
not report to the Treasury Secretary. At every agency, there is someone at 
the top of the reporting chain who does not report to anybody else. So long 
as that person is subject to the President’s removal power, it can hardly be a 
problem that the person doesn’t report to someone else, because, as 
observed above, the removal power is all the President might have to 
control the "someone else" to whom the person might report. 
Mr. Sims next points out that, unlike most Inspectors General, the 
SIGTARP files reports directly with Congress without first running them by 
a cabinet secretary for comment.31  This point seems rather trivial. The 
Secretary of the Treasury may not have the express statutory power to 
comment on the SIGTARP’s reports, but nothing stops him from doing so. 
Once the reports are filed, anyone in the country is free to comment on 
them, and that would include the Treasury Secretary. There could hardly be 
a constitutional difference between getting the Secretary’s comment in the 
same document and receiving it separately, after the report is filed. 
Finally, there is the point on which Mr. Sims lays the most stress: The 
SIGTARP has the power to identify deficiencies in the TARP program, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury is required either to redress those deficiencies 
or to certify that no action is necessary or appropriate.32  There are two 
answers to this point. First, even reading this requirement for all it is worth, 
it still just shows that there are two different government officials, each of 
whom serves at the pleasure of the President, who have some authority over 
the same issue. That may be bad policy, but it is hardly unconstitutional. 
Second, the statute would still be constitutional even if we were to 
stack the deck in favor of Mr. Sims’s argument, and imagine that the 
SIGTARP were not removable at will by the President, but in fact was 
removable only for good cause. Mr. Sims reads too much into the statutory 
requirement that the Secretary must act in response to the SIGTARP’s 
identification of a deficiency in the TARP program. Statutes, one must 
29. Sims, supra note 1, at 389. 
30. See id. (observing that, while the SIGTARP’s organic statute explicitly requires 
that SIGTARP report to Congress, it does not explicitly require the SIGTARP to report to or 
to be supervised by an agency head). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 408–13, 426, 429–30. 
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remember, should, where possible, be interpreted so as to save their 
constitutionality, not to create unnecessary constitutional problems.33  This 
power of the SIGTARP, properly read, does not create some intolerable 
burden on the Secretary of the Treasury. Rather, it leaves him ample room 
to do what he thinks best. 
First, it is hardly intolerable that the Secretary of the Treasury should 
be obliged either to fix a problem identified by the SIGTARP or explain 
why he is not doing so. There are many situations in which a government 
agency is required to respond to a request for action. Any citizen can ask a 
government agency to initiate a rulemaking proceeding, and the agency 
must either do so, or explain satisfactorily why it is not doing so.34 
Moreover, Congress may lay down mandatory guidelines for agencies to 
take individual enforcement actions, and in such a case, if someone requests 
an enforcement action and the agency does not undertake it, the agency’s 
decision is subject to judicial review, which means that the agency must 
explain to a court’s satisfaction why it has not undertaken the requested 
enforcement.35  The SIGTARP statute does no more than create another 
situation in which an agency has to provide an explanation for not acting. 
Moreover, even assuming that a pro forma explanation would be 
unacceptable, the statute, properly read, would not force the Treasury 
Secretary to act against his will. If the SIGTARP recommends certain 
action, and the Treasury Secretary thinks the action would be a bad idea, 
then necessarily he thinks that action is neither "necessary" nor 
"appropriate." The Treasury Secretary might even agree that the SIGTARP 
has identified a deficiency in the TARP program, but believe that correcting 
33. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) 
("[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ we are 
obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems." (citations omitted)). 
34. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The 
[Administrative Procedure Act] requires agencies to allow interested persons to ‘petition for 
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,’ and, when such petitions are denied, to give ‘a 
brief statement of the grounds for denial.’"); cf. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 
U.S. 497, 527 (2007) ("In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate 
rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and 
subject to special formalities, including a public explanation.’" (citations omitted)). 
35. With respect to individualized enforcement actions, an agency’s failure to act is 
usually beyond judicial review, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985), but Congress 
may provide mandatory guidelines for an agency’s exercise of its enforcement powers, and, 
where Congress has done so, an individual citizen may request an enforcement action and 
may seek judicial review if the agency declines to bring one. See generally Dunlop v. 
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
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the deficiency would cost more than the benefit that would be gained. 
Again, that would be a reason to determine that correcting the deficiency is 
neither necessary nor appropriate. 
Thus, while the SIGTARP statute may create some burden of 
explanation, agencies are constantly called upon to explain why they are or 
are not doing something. That is hardly a constitutionally forbidden 
burden. 
In the end, therefore, the SIGTARP’s powers seem far less 
constitutionally problematic than those of the independent counsel, which 
were approved in Morrison. The independent counsel actually exercised 
very considerable governmental power. Although that power was directed 
to a particular case, and did not involve general policy development, the 
independent counsel made actual decisions on behalf of the government. 
All SIGTARP can do is issue reports and call matters to the attention of 
some other official, who actually makes the decisions, and if that other 
official would rather do nothing, the statute requires only that he explain 
why. 
If we can tolerate the independent counsel’s making actual decisions, 
we can tolerate the SIGTARP calling matters to the attention of the 
Treasury Secretary. That would likely be true even if the SIGTARP were 
protected by a good cause removal provision, and it follows a fortiori that it 
is constitutionally permissible given that in fact the SIGTARP serves at the 
pleasure of the President. 
V. Conclusion 
Mr. Sims has written a fine paper that takes on an important issue and 
does a good job of calling attention to the relevant details. His ultimate 
conclusion, however, seems incorrect. The separation of powers cases 
permit more flexibility in government structure than Mr. Sims would allow. 
In particular, highlighting the SIGTARP’s status as serving at the pleasure 
of the President, and comparing the SIGTARP’s powers to those that have 
been approved even for officials who do not serve at the pleasure of the 
President, leads to the conclusion that the SIGTARP statute would likely be 
upheld by a court as constitutional. 
